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The tension between an extremely barebones Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure Form 18 for patent infringement lawsuits and 
Supreme Court case law through Twombly and Iqbal has made it 
difficult for courts to dismiss frivolous patent litigation at the 
complaint stage. In this article, I look at the Federal Circuit’s 
treatment of Twombly and Iqbal, empirically evaluate 12(b)(6) 
motions from various district courts, and summarize local patent 
rules from the Eastern District of Texas. I conclude that the 
biggest likely impact of statutorily heightening and defining 
patent pleading standards through the proposed Innovation Act 
would be to provide much-needed uniformity in the endeavor of 
gatekeeping weak lawsuits, without serious adverse impact. 
INTRODUCTION 
Recently, there has been growing concern that our courts have 
become inundated with frivolous claims of patent infringement.1  So-
called “patent trolls” bring suits while lacking any basis for believing 
they will actually win on their patent infringement claims, but with the 
hope that the defendant will settle and pay these trolls money to go 
away.2 According to some reports, patent trolls now account for a 
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1 See James Bessen, Patent Trolling Was Up 11 Percent Last Year, WASH. POST 
(Jan. 31, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/2014/01 
/31/patent-trolling-was-up-11-percent-last-year/ (“Is there a patent troll crisis? 
Conventional wisdom holds that there is.”).  
2 See EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, PATENT ASSERTION AND U.S. 
INNOVATION 1 (2013), available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/ 
files/docs/patent_report.pdf (noting that patent trolls focus on aggressive 
litigation and use tactics such as suing large numbers of companies, creating 
shell companies to hide the real plaintiff, and overestimating the reach of their 
patents). 
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majority of all patent assertions in the United States.3 Patent trolls, 
unsurprisingly, often assert weak patents.4 However, weak patents are 
not limited to non-practicing entities or patent assertion entities – several 
times large, operating companies also assert weak patents in litigation.5 
The legislature has been considering various approaches to tackle the 
issue of frivolous lawsuits, especially patent assertion suits. The 
Innovation Act,6 sponsored by Rep. Goodlatte, is a comprehensive bill 
addressing different aspects of patent litigation.7 One of its major 
proposed changes is a heightened pleading requirement.8 The Innovation 
Act has already passed in the House.9 On February 5, 2015, Rep. 
Goodlatte reintroduced his patent reform bill.10 
The aim of this article is to predict whether raising pleading 
standards for patent-related claims is a legitimate way of filtering out 
unmeritorious lawsuits. First, I examine the United States Supreme 
Court’s changes to pleading requirements by surveying case law. By 
comparing claims of direct and indirect infringement after the key 
Supreme Court cases, I evaluate the effect of the new pleading standards. 
Then, I evaluate the proposals of the Innovation Act. Additionally, I 
compare the Innovation Act’s proposed heightened pleading 
requirements to the local rules of the Eastern District of Texas. My 
analysis leads to the conclusion that the proposed heightened pleading 
standards of the Innovation Act would provide uniformity to patent 
pleading cases, and also likely be an efficient means of keeping out 
frivolous lawsuits. 
                                                
3 Mark A. Lemley & A. Douglas Melamed, Missing the Forest for the Trolls, 
113 COLUM. L. REV. 2117, 2119 (2013). 
4 Id. What constitutes a ‘weak patent’ is of course debatable. Here, I am using 
the term to refer to patents that are likely to be invalidated in a strong 
invalidation proceeding. 
5 See generally, Ted Sichelman, The Vonage Trilogy: A Case in “Patent 
Bullying”, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 543 (2014). 
6 H.R. 3309, 113th Cong. (2013). 
7 Dennis Crouch, New Patent Legislation: Innovation Act of 2013, PATENTLY-O 
(Oct. 24, 2013), http://patentlyo.com/patent/2013/10/new-patent-legislation-
innovation-act-of-2013.html. 
8 Id. 
9 Timothy B. Lee, Patent Reform Bill Passes the House 325 to 91. Here’s What 
You Need to Know, WASH. POST (Dec. 5, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost. 
com/blogs/the-switch/wp/2013/12/05/the-house-votes-on-patent-reform-today-
heres-what-you-need-to-know/. 
10 Dennis Crouch, Patent Reform: Innovation Act of 2015, PATENTLY-O (Feb. 5, 
2015), http://patentlyo.com/patent/2015/02/patent-reform-innovation.html. 




I. TWOMBLY, IQBAL, AND MOTIONS TO DISMISS 
Nuisance litigation is not unique to patent law. Various civil 
procedural devices exist to prevent the progress of lawsuits when it has 
become clear that further use of judicial resources would be wasteful.11 
One of the earliest points at which the judicial system can filter out 
unmeritorious lawsuits is at the pleading stage.12 Although heightened 
pleading requirements aim to keep discovery costs low, they are not 
always seen as the best solution to discovery abuses.13  
The United States Supreme Court, through the landmark 
decisions of Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly14 and Ashcroft v. Iqbal,15 
effectively raised the bar as far as the standard for what a plaintiff must 
allege in her complaint for a civil lawsuit to proceed beyond the pleading 
stage—although according to the Court, it was simply reiterating the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP) standard.16  
To dispel any conjecture that Twombly might be applicable only 
to antitrust cases, Iqbal affirmed the holding in Twombly, and made it 
unambiguously applicable to all kinds of civil lawsuits. Iqbal suggested a 
two prong approach, requiring: (1) the distinguishing of facts from legal 
conclusions; and (2) a plausibility standard, as opposed to a possibility 
standard.17 
                                                
11 Louis Kaplow, Multistage Adjudication, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1179, 1180 
(2013). 
12 Id. 
13 See, e.g., Patrick E. Higginbotham, The Present Plight of the United States 
District Courts, 60 DUKE L.J. 745, 751–52 (“[P]articularized pleading is a poorly 
tailored response [to discovery abuses]. Broad access to discovery is often a 
necessity in suits by private attorneys general, especially in a country so 
dependent on private suits to enforce federal normative standards.”). 
14 550 U.S. 544 (2007). 
15 556 U.S. 662 (2009). 
16 The Court instead insisted it was simply interpreting Rule 8(a) of the FRCP, 
which only requires “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 
pleader is entitled to relief.” FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). However, it is widely 
acknowledged that pleading standards have, in effect, changed since Twombly 
and Iqbal. See, e.g., Douglas G. Smith, The Evolution of a New Pleading 
Standard: Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 88 OR. L. REV. 1053, 1054 (2009) (discussing the 
“new” standard post-Twombly). 
17 William M. Janssen, Iqbal “Plausibility” in Pharmaceutical and Medical 
Device Litigation, 71 LA. L. REV. 541, 563 (2011) (“The standard will not be 
satisfied by what the Court denominated as bald, non-factual conclusions of law 
. . . . ‘[W]ithout some further factual enhancement [these conclusions] stop[] 
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Iqbal and Twombly, although applicable to patent infringement 
suits equally in theory, did not have the same effect in patent suits due to 
Form 18 of the FRCP.18 Form 18 requires a plaintiff only to make a very 
barebones pleading contrary to Iqbal’s intentions—by only requiring 
cursory and conclusory statements about the patent’s ownership, the act 
of infringement, and notice.19 Form 18 effectively supersedes Twombly 
and Iqbal because it comes straight from the legislature, specifically for 
suits of direct patent infringement.20 
However, Form 18 does not apply to claims of indirect patent 
infringement. Indirect infringement occurs when the accused infringer 
does not practice a patent himself, but rather contributes to an overall act 
of infringement, or induces a third party into committing an act of 
infringement.21 The elements involved in contributory infringement or 
                                                                                                         
short of the line between possibility and plausibility of “entitle[ment] to 
relief.”’” (final alteration in original) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). 
18 FED. R. CIV. P. FORM 18; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 84 (“The forms in the 
Appendix suffice under these rules and illustrate the simplicity and brevity that 
these rules contemplate.”). 
19 FED. R. CIV. P. FORM 18. The entire text of Form 18 reads: 
1. <Statement of Federal Jurisdiction> 
2. On <Date>, United States Letters Patent No. <_________________> 
were issued to the plaintiff for an invention in an electric motor. The 
plaintiff owned the patent throughout the period of the defendant’s 
infringing acts and still owns the patent. 
3. The defendant has infringed and is still infringing the Letters Patent 
by making, selling, and using electric motors that embody the patented 
invention, and the defendant will continue to do so unless enjoined by 
this court. 
4. The plaintiff has complied with the statutory requirement of placing 
a notice of the Letters Patent on all electric motors it manufactures and 
sells and has given the defendant written notice of the infringement. 
Therefore, the plaintiff demands: 
(a) a preliminary and final injunction against the continuing  
infringement; 
(b) an accounting for damages; and 
(c) interest and costs.  
20 See infra Part III.A. 
21 35 U.S.C. § 271(b)–(c) (2012) ((“Whoever actively induces infringement of a 
patent shall be liable as an infringer.”) See also Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. 
SEB SA, 131 S.Ct. 2060 (2011)); 35 U.S.C. § 271(c) (“Whoever offers to sell or 
sells within the United States or imports into the United States a component of a 
patented machine, manufacture, combination or composition, or a material or 
apparatus for use in practicing a patented process, constituting a material part of 
the invention, knowing the same to be especially made or especially adapted for 
use in an infringement of such patent, and not a staple article or commodity of 
 




inducement of infringement are different from direct infringement; hence 
Form 18 does not provide a framework for pleading indirect 
infringement.22 The more stringent pleading standards of Twombly and 
Iqbal still apply to cases of indirect infringement. 
II. PATENT INFRINGEMENT CASES SINCE IQBAL – A BRIEF LOOK 
There have been many empirical studies of district court cases 
applying Iqbal to motions to dismiss.23 One such study from 2011 argues 
that district and circuit courts applied Iqbal non-uniformly in the years 
following the decision.24 In general, the number of 12(b)(6) motions that 
were filed and sustained increased significantly, with almost all of them 
citing to Iqbal or Twombly’s plausibility standard.25 
The Federal Circuit has addressed the question of applying Iqbal 
to patent pleading in two key cases – McZeal v. Sprint Nextel Corp.26 and 
K-Tech Telecommunications v. Time Warner. 27 
A. Federal Circuit’s Approach to Patent Pleading After Iqbal 
1. Direct Infringement 
i. McZeal v. Sprint Nextel Corp. 
 The first time the Federal Circuit was asked to apply Iqbal in a 
patent pleading case was in McZeal. McZeal was a pro se plaintiff, 
alleging that Sprint Nextel infringed his U.S. Patent No. 6,763,226 
(hereinafter “the ’226 patent”) through the Motorola i930 cellular 
telephone.28 McZeal filed a “motion for a temporary restraining order, a 
                                                                                                         
commerce suitable for substantial noninfringing use, shall be liable as a 
contributory infringer.”) 
22 See FED. R. CIV. P. FORM 18 (stating only that “defendant . . . is still infringing 
the Letters Patent by making, selling, and using [the patented invention].” 
(emphasis added)). 
23 E.g., Colleen McNamara, Iqbal as Judicial Rorschach Test: An Empirical 
Study of District Court Interpretations of Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 
401 (2011). 
24 Id. at 433. 
25 Lonny Hoffman, Twombly and Iqbal’s Measure: An Assessment of the 
Federal Judicial Center's Study of Motions to Dismiss, 6 FED. CTS. L. REV. 1, 1 
(2011). 
26 McZeal v. Sprint Nextel Corp., 501 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
27 K-Tech Telecomms., Inc. v. Time Warner Cable, Inc., 714 F.3d 1277 (Fed. 
Cir. 2013). 
28 McZeal, 501 F.3d at 1355. 
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preliminary injunction, a permanent injunction, and a request for an 
expedited hearing.”29 
The district court granted Sprint’s motion to dismiss the ninety-
five page complaint, concluding that the complaint did not state a 
claim.30 The district court did not even grant an opportunity for McZeal 
to amend the complaint, stating the complaint was irreparable because it 
was not just “missing facts” but lacked “any facts” at all.31 
On appeal, the Federal Circuit reversed. It held that Twombly did 
not alter the pleading standard for patent infringement cases, specifically 
one brought by a pro se plaintiff.32 In the opinion by Judge Archer, the 
Federal Circuit referenced what might be termed conclusory allegations, 
to support its view that McZeal’s case was well pleaded.33  
Under the court’s reasoning, McZeal (1) asserted ownership of 
the ’226 patent; (2) named Sprint Nextel as defendants; (3) alleged that 
the ’226 patent was infringed; (4) stated that Sprint Nextel’s “machine[s] 
physically . . . perform[ed] all of the basic elements contained in the 
patent claims . . . and further alleged under the doctrine of equivalents”; 
and (5) identified the areas of patent law implicated by the case.34 
Accordingly, nothing more was required to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) 
motion. 
Judge Dyk, in his dissent, disagreed with the majority with 
respect to whether there was a sufficient allegation of infringement. He 
discussed Form 18 (then Form 16) in detail. Importantly, he noted that 
Form 18 did not address the complex “doctrine of equivalents”, an 
essential part of McZeal’s claim.35 Indeed, Judge Dyk went so far as to 
call McZeal’s behavior sanctionable given McZeal’s failure to 
investigate the accused device.36 
McZeal was a curious decision in that it seemed to reinterpret the 
precedent set by the Supreme Court in Iqbal and Twombly. It was a 
decision that did not specifically refer to Form 18; the Federal Circuit 
simply interpreted Twombly and Iqbal in a manner suggesting they had 
done nothing to the Rule 8 notice pleading standard. 




32 Id. at 1356–57, 1356 n.4. 
33 Id. at 1357. 
34 Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
35 Id. at 1361. 
36 Id. at 1363.  




ii. K-Tech Telecommunications v. Time Warner 
The Federal Circuit more recently took up the issue of pleading 
again in 2013. The procedural posture and outcome of K-Tech was 
similar to McZeal, with the Federal Circuit reaffirming its resistance to 
apply the heightened pleading standards from Twombly and Iqbal. 
K-Tech filed a complaint for patent infringement against 
DirecTV and Time Warner Cable in the United States District Court for 
the Central District of California, alleging direct infringement of its four 
patents involving transformation of digital-broadcast-signal sub-channels 
into a new numbering system for cable transmission.37 The district court 
dismissed K-Tech’s infringement lawsuit by sustaining a FRCP Rule 
12(b)(6) motion for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be 
granted, citing Twombly and stating:  
Although Plaintiff strongly believes that Defendant “must” be 
infringing the Asserted Patents, Plaintiff fails to explain the basis of 
this belief. Plaintiff does not explain why it believes that Defendant 
is utilizing the methods and products protected by the Asserted 
Patents to update the digital signals it receives rather than using 
other noninfringing methods and products.38  
The district court also dismissed a first amended complaint for the same 
reasons.39 
On appeal, the Federal Circuit reversed and remanded, basing its 
reasoning on the existence of Form 18.40 Citing to R+L Carriers,41 the 
court held that “proper use of a form contained in the Appendix of Forms 
effectively immunizes a claimant from attack regarding the sufficiency 
of the pleading.”42 Expounding on the area of potential conflict between 
case law and the FRCP, the Federal Circuit noted that the forms of the 
FRCP would control.43 However, the majority opinion also noted that 
                                                
37 K-Tech, 714 F.3d at 1280; see Dennis Crouch, Federal Circuit Supports Bare-
Bones Patent Complaints, PATENTLY-O (Apr. 23, 2013), http://patentlyo. 
com/patent/2013/04/federal-circuit-supports-bare-bones-patent-complaints.html 
(describing the essence of the complaint). 
38 K-Tech, 714 F.3d at 1280. 
39 Id. 
40 Id. at 1284. 
41 In re Bill of Lading Transmission & Processing Sys. Patent Litig., 681 F.3d 
1323 (Fed. Cir. 2012). 
42 K-Tech, 714 F.3d at 1283. 
43 Id. 
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there was not necessarily a conflict between Form 18 and 
Twombly/Iqbal.44 
In his concurring opinion, Judge Wallach disagreed that the 
FRCP Forms always controlled over the Supreme Court’s plausibility 
standard as set forth in Twombly and Iqbal.45 Professor Dennis Crouch, 
in his blog, pointed out the paradox with respect to pleading uniformity: 
One odd element of the decision is that the court indicated that the 
judgment on whether claims had been sufficiently pled is not a 
patent specific matter. The consequence of that is that Federal 
Circuit follows the lead of the appropriate regional circuit court of 
appeal . . . Form 18 is a national form, and any argument that [one] 
should interpret it differently here than [one] did in R+L Carriers is 
without merit. One trick here is that [one] ordinarily do[es] not 
apply common law interpretation to the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure – meaning that precedential decisions of the regional 
circuits have less weight in this area than in other areas of law.46 
This strange case of circularity leaves the Federal Circuit as the 
sole determinant of pleading standards for patent infringement because, 
although it is supposed to apply the law of the regional circuit on 
procedural matters, no such law exists for patent pleading.47  
2. Indirect Infringement 
i. Superior Industries v. Thor Global Enterprises 
The Federal Circuit took up the issue of pleading sufficiency for 
claims of induced and contributory infringement post-Iqbal in Superior 
Industries, LLC v. Thor Global Enterprises, Ltd.48 Superior filed suit 
                                                
44 See id. at 1284 (“[W]e [do not] seek to create conflict where none exists. A 
complaint containing just enough information to satisfy a governing form may 
well be sufficient under Twombly and Iqbal.”). 
45 See id. at 1288 (comparing Form 9 for pleading negligence with Form 18 for 
pleading patent infringement). 
46 Dennis Crouch, Federal Circuit Supports Bare-Bones Patent Complaints, 
PATENTLY-O (Apr. 23, 2013), http://patentlyo.com/patent/2013/04/federal- 
circuit-supports-bare-bones-patent-complaints.html. 
47 See Adam Steinmetz, Note, Pleading Patent Infringement: Applying the 
Standard Established by Twombly and Iqbal to the Patent Context, 13 COLUM. 
SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 482, 512 (2012) (explaining that the Federal Circuit applies 
its own law to substantive and procedural issues that intimately involve the 
enforcement of a patent right). 
48 Superior Indus., LLC v. Thor Global Enters., Ltd., 700 F.3d 1287 (Fed. Cir. 
2012). 




against Thor for infringement of two of its patents.49 Superior’s First 
Amended Complaint alleged that Thor “ha[d] been and [was] directly 
infringing, actively inducing others to infringe and/or contributing to the 
infringement of one or more claims of [its] Patent[s] by its unauthorized 
making, using, offering to sell, selling and/or importing a telescoping 
conveyor having the Thor Undercarriage Technology in and/or to the 
United States.”50 The District Court for the District of Minnesota 
dismissed the complaint with prejudice.51 
While reversing dismissal of direct infringement claims because 
of lower pleading standards, the Federal Circuit affirmed dismissal of 
indirect infringement claims for not meeting heightened pleading 
standards. It reiterated that “Form 18 does not determine the sufficiency 
of pleading for claims of indirect infringement. Rather, the pleading 
requirements set forth in Twombly and Iqbal apply to such claims. This 
court finds Superior's complaint falls far short of pleading facts necessary 
to state a plausible claim for either induced or contributory 
infringement.”52 It went on to add: 
Superior does not allege that the accused products are “especially 
made or especially adapted for use in an infringement of such 
patent, and not a staple article or commodity of commerce suitable 
for substantial noninfringing use” as required by 35 U.S.C. § 
271(c). Similarly, Superior does not allege any facts to support a 
reasonable inference that Thor specifically intended to induce 
infringement of the '231 Patent or that it knew it had induced acts 
that constitute infringement. This court therefore affirms the 
dismissal of Superior's claims of indirect infringement under 35 
U.S.C. §§ 271(b) and (c).53 
Here, the Federal Circuit was unequivocal in separating claims 
of indirect infringement from direct infringement, indicating that Form 
18 did not apply to direct infringement, and then proceeding to apply the 
heightened pleading requirements of Twombly and Iqbal to indirect 
infringement. One issue the Federal Circuit left unresolved is whether the 
heightened pleading requirement for indirect infringement would further 
depend on whether contributory or induced infringement was being 
alleged.54 For example, in Superior Industries, it is unclear whether a 
                                                
49 Id. at 1290. 
50 Id. at 1290–91. 
51 Id. at 1289. 
52 Id. at 1295–96. 
53 Id. 
54 Induced infringement requires a scienter element. See supra note 22 and 
accompanying text.  
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conclusory allegation that accused products were especially adapted for 
use in an infringement of patent at suit would be sufficient to overcome 
dismissal of the contributory infringement claim. 
B. Examples of District Court Applications of Iqbal 
In this section, I examine district court cases from various 
circuits dealing with motions to dismiss of direct infringement suits. In 
general, the courts are split on the precise impact of Twombly on patent 
cases.55 However, complaints of direct infringement have hardly been 
dismissed at the pleading stage, thanks to Form 18—irrespective of Iqbal 
or Twombly. David Donaghue, a practicing attorney, argues that 
“[w]hereas the playing field between plaintiffs and defendants was fairly 
and predictably level before Twombly, the uneven application of 
Twombly by lower courts has tilted that playing field decidedly in favor 
of plaintiffs.”56 
1. Atwater Partners of Texas LLC v. AT & T, Inc.  
One of the hotbeds for patent activity, the Eastern District of 
Texas, took up an interesting pleading case which illustrates the 
incentives at play in allegedly frivolous litigation in 2011. 
In Atwater,57 defendant Adtran, Inc. (Adtran) moved to not only 
dismiss plaintiff Atwater’s claims of patent infringement, but also moved 
for Rule 11 sanctions against Atwater.58 The court, citing Form 18, 
denied the 12(b)(6) motion even though Atwater had not specified what 
Adtran’s infringing products were.59 
Adtran further argued that Atwater had to be subject to Rule 11 
sanctions. Adtran alleged that because Atwater ought to have complied 
with the pre-filing investigation requirements of FRCP 11, Atwater 
should have specified the names of specific infringing products. 
Therefore Adtran argued that Atwater should be reprimanded for not 
including that information in its pleading.60 
                                                
55 R. David Donoghue, The Uneven Application of Twombly in Patent 
Cases: An Argument for Leveling the Playing Field, 8 JOHN MARSHALL REV. 
INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 2 (2008). 
56 Id. at 2–3. 
57 Atwater Partners of Tex. LLC v. AT & T, Inc., No. 2:10-cv-175-TJW, 2011 
WL 1004880 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 18, 2011). 
58 Id. at *1, 4; see generally FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c) (setting forth sanction 
procedures). 
59 Atwater Partners of Tex. LLC., 2011 WL 1004880, at *1. 
60 Id. at *4. 




The court disagreed with Adtran’s reasoning, turning the tables 
against it instead: 
Although this Court has mentioned Rule 11 in connection with Rule 
12(b)(6) motions in the past, this Court has never held or implied 
that merely because a party presumably has certain information via 
its pre-filing investigation that it should be required to include that 
information in its pleading. Rule 8(a) requires only a complaint 
contain a ‘short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 
pleader is entitled to relief.’ Rule 8(a) does not state a complaint 
must contain all relevant and material information that the party 
possesses by virtue of its pre-filing investigation that is required by 
Rule 11. Furthermore, the Court observes that Rule 11 cuts both 
ways, that is, it is also a violation of Rule 11 to file a frivolous 
motion. This includes a frivolous Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss 
for failure to state a claim. As described above, not much is required 
to satisfy the pleading standards for patent infringement under 
Federal Circuit case law and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Form 
18.61 
The court was seemingly more concerned about frivolous 
12(b)(6) motions than about frivolous patent infringement suits. 
C. Indirect Infringement Claims Since Iqbal 
1. Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) v. Shire PLC 
 The District Court for the District of Massachusetts addressed a 
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss a claim for inducement of infringement in 
MIT v. Shire PLC.62 The plaintiffs (MIT and Children’s Medical Center 
Corporation) alleged that a product produced and sold by defendant Shire 
PLC, Dermagraft (a skin substitute, derived from natal foreskin tissue, 
used to treat foot ulcers of diabetic patients) infringed their patents.63 
Apart from alleging direct infringement, the plaintiffs also alleged willful 
inducement of infringement.64 
Sustaining the motion to dismiss, the court noted that the Federal 
Circuit had held that the heightening pleading standard from Twombly 
and Iqbal applied to indirect infringement claims.65 The language of the 
                                                
61 Id. 
62 Mass. Inst. of Tech. v. Shire PLC, No. 1:13-CV-10020-MLW, 2014 WL 
404696, at *8–10 (D. Mass. Feb. 2, 2014). 
63 Id. at *1. 
64 Id. 
65 Id. at *8. 
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court gives us some hint of how it would consider a direct infringement 
claim if not for the presence of Form 18: 
The allegations in the complaint and the letters it references are not 
sufficient to satisfy the pleading standard established in Iqbal and 
[Twombly]. The allegations that the defendants are “involved in the 
manufacturing, marketing, and selling” of [the infringing product] 
might be sufficient for a claim of direct infringement. They do not, 
however, adequately support the more demanding specific intent 
requirement for a finding of induced infringement. Furthermore, 
these allegations, without any other support from within the 
complaint, do not qualify as “non-conclusory, non-speculative” 
facts from which the court can draw reasonable inferences in the 
plaintiff's favor.66 
This reasoning suggests that there are two issues at play here: the 
specific intent requirement of inducement, which requires the pleading of 
specific facts (governed by FRCP Rule 9(b)); and the idea that indirect 
infringement is not governed by Form 18.  
2. Logic Devices, Inc. v. Apple, Inc. 
 The District Court for the Northern District of California, in a 
recent case, applied a heightened pleading standard to allegations of 
contributory infringement.67 Logic Devices, in a short complaint, simply 
alleged inducement, contributory infringement, and willful infringement 
of their U.S. Patent No. 5,524,244 without factual allegations to draw a 
reasonable inference that the defendants are liable for the misconduct 
alleged.68 
The court noted that “[o]ther than Logic Devices’ prayer for 
relief, Logic Devices’ complaint fails to allege any facts supporting a 
plausible inference of contributory infringement.”69 The complaint 
lacked any description of “whether the accused products [were] capable 
of substantial non-infringing uses” and the court emphasized that “[o]ne 
sentence in the prayer for relief cannot suffice to allege contributory 
                                                
66 Id. at *9 (emphasis added). 
67 Logic Devices, Inc. v. Apple, Inc., No. C13-02943 WHA, 2014 WL 60056 
(N.D. Cal. Jan. 7, 2014). 
68 Id. at *1. 
69 Id. at *2 (emphasis added). 




infringement.”70 What this suggests is that an empty recitation of the 
elements of contributory infringement would be insufficient.71 
D. Empirical Study of Cases Applying Iqbal 
As mentioned before, because of Form 18, it is reasonable to 
assume complaints of direct patent infringement are hardly ever 
dismissed for failure to state a claim. However, based on limited data, an 
analysis of the indirect infringement pleadings from the major districts 
provides some counterintuitive results, as well as interesting clues about 
how different courts have been treating Iqbal when it comes to claims of 
indirect infringement. 
 The dataset for my analysis consisted of available the district 
court patent lawsuits that cited to Iqbal.72 The final dataset consisted of 
forty cases. Of this sample, a motion to dismiss was granted in fourteen 
cases. Of these fourteen cases where a 12(b)(6) motion was granted, 
seven were claims of direct infringement. These seven cases came from 
all across the country (Michigan, Texas, Missouri, New York, Puerto 
Rico and Louisiana), indicating that various trial courts are willing to 
dismiss weak suits at the 12(b)(6) stage in spite of Form 18. 
Analysis of sample of cases citing to Iqbal: 
                                                
70 Id. 
71 See, e.g., Donoghue, supra note 56, at 11 (describing the United States 
District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin as having a “minor 
additional pleading requirement”—“requir[ing] plaintiffs to identify the specific 
claims that they assert are infringed and which products allegedly infringe 
them.”). 
72 The exact procedures for creating the final dataset were as follows: Using the 
Westlaw database, I obtained a list of all district court cases citing to Iqbal. 
From this list, I filtered to only those cases concerning patents. Within this, I 
filtered to those cases whose case summary related to ‘contributory’ or 
‘induced’ or ‘indirect.’ 
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Fig. 1: Outcome of 12(b)(6) motions based on entire sample. 
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Fig. 3: Break up of cases where motion to dismiss was denied. 
Obviously, the data is somewhat limited and potentially suffers 
from various sampling biases.73 As a first look, it should be reflective of 
how courts have been treating Iqbal in patent cases. 
Results from a quick empirical analysis of 12(b)(6) motions as 
shown above do not align with case law from the Federal Circuit. 
Because of the presence of Form 18, one would expect very few motions 
to dismiss, if any, to be granted in direct infringement cases. On the other 
hand, one would expect more indirect infringement cases to be dismissed 
at the pleading stage. Disregarding an unlikely explanation that these 
difference arise from stark differences in the way plaintiffs plead direct 
and indirect infringement, the results show that Form 18 and case law 
and applied non-uniformly in the district courts.  
III. LOCAL RULES IN DISTRICT COURTS – E.D. TEXAS 
Some district courts, particularly the Eastern District of Texas, 
have already been requiring parties to allege facts to make allegations of 
infringement more ‘plausible’ through local rules, in effect, raising the 
                                                
73 First, the Westlaw database is not comprehensive. Second, my method of 
creating the initial dataset—all cases that cite to Iqbal—does not involve 
sampling. And finally, the other manual filtering steps to limit the dataset to 
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pleading standards.74 These are required typically at initial case 
conferences.75  
Local rules require a party alleging patent infringement to serve 
detailed information regarding accused products and method, including 
claim charts on the opposing party ten days before the Initial Case 
Management Conference.76 This goes right to the heart of what might be 
asked of parties by a heightened pleading requirement.  
In an opinion discussing the requirements of local rules vis-à-vis 
Twombly and Iqbal, the District Court for the Northern District of 
Georgia noted that the “Northern District's Local Patent Rules require[d] 
plaintiffs to disclose a great deal of extremely detailed information . . . 
Any plaintiff filing a patent case in this district knows that these 
disclosures must be made early. Requiring similar detailed factual 
disclosures at the pleading stage would serve no useful purpose.” This 
suggests that statutorily requiring more at pleading might lead to early 
dismissal of unmeritorious lawsuits.77  
IV. RAISING PLEADING STANDARDS BY STATUTE – THE 
INNOVATION ACT 
The Innovation Act is an attempt to reduce the number of 
frivolous lawsuits that are being filed.78 The ostensible goal of the 
legislation, according to Rep. Goodlatte, who introduced the bill, is to “to 
address the abusive practices that have damaged our patent system and 
resulted in significant economic harm to our nation.”79 Some authors 
                                                
74 Donoghue, supra note 56, at 12. Donaghue also mentions the Northern 
District of Georgia and the Northern District of California as examples of 
districts that “narrow cases even more effectively than Twombly's heightened 
pleading requirements.” Id. 
75 Id. 
76 E.D. TEX. P. R. 3-1 (2014), available at http://www.txed.uscourts.gov/cgi- 
bin/view_document.cgi?document=1179. 
77 CBT Flint Partners, LLC v. Goodmail Sys., Inc., 529 F. Supp. 2d 1376, 1380–
81 (N.D. Ga. 2007). 
78 George M. Gould, Congress Reintroduces Innovation Act in Hopes to Curb 
Frivolous Patent Litigation, IP LAW ALERT (Apr. 7, 2015), 
http://www.iplawalert.com/2015/04/articles/patent/congress-reintroduces- 
innovation-act-in-hopes-to-curb-frivolous-patent-litigation/. 
79 Jeff Becker, Intellectual Property Report: The Latest in Patent Reform: The 
Innovation Act (H.R. 3309), BAKER BOTTS (Dec. 2013), 
http://www.bakerbotts.com/file_upload/IPReport201312-TheLatestInPatent 
ReformTheInnovationActHR3309.htm. 




have expressed concern that the Innovation Act, in addition to or instead 
of stopping trolls, could potentially stifle innovation.80 
One focus of the Innovation Act is on statutorily raising pleading 
standards. Apart from a proposal to abandon Form 18, it contains 
language requiring more detail in a complaint of patent infringement.81 
For example, similar to the local rules discussed in the previous section, 
the Innovation Act would require the complaint to include, for each 
accused product, an “identification of each claim of each patent . . . that 
is allegedly infringed,” the name or model number (if known), and a 
detailed explanation of where each element of the claim is found in the 
accused product.82 The complaint would also be required to explain, 
“with detailed specificity, how each limitation of each claim . . . is met 
by the accused [product].”83 Other authors have likewise recommended 
new patent pleading standards.84 
V. WHAT CAN WE EXPECT FROM HIGHER PLEADING STANDARDS? 
In this article, I have evaluated the current state of motions to 
dismiss patent infringement allegations through various methods, based 
on the Federal Circuit’s treatment of Twombly and Iqbal, empirical 
examination of district court patent cases, and comparison to local patent 
rules in the Eastern District of Texas. Because the proposed rules of the 
Innovation Act are similar to Supreme Court case law on the topic and to 
some local patent rules, it is possible to predict the impact of such a 
proposal to a fair extent. 
Overall, it is likely that statutorily raising pleading standards will 
have a positive impact on patent infringement suits. I discuss the 
probable consequences of such a measure in three parts: uniformity of 
pleading standards, the effect on “troll” lawsuits, and possible adverse 
effects on legitimate patent litigation. 
A. Uniformity to Pleading Standards 
 Perhaps most importantly, statutorily defining pleading standards 
to supplement FRCP Rule 8 will provide much-needed uniformity to the 
judgment of motions to dismiss. As seen in the previous sections, local 
                                                
80 E.g., Kellan Howell, Patent Law Reform Bill to Stop Trolls Could Also Stifle 
Innovation, Critics Say, WASH. TIMES (Feb. 5, 2015), http://www.washington 
times.com/news/2015/feb/5/patent-law-reform-bill-to- 
stop-trolls-could-stifle/?page=all. 
81 H.R. 3309, 113th Cong. § 6(c)(1) (2013). 
82 Id. § 3(a)(1). 
83 Id. 
84 E.g., Steinmetz, supra note 48, at 516. 
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district courts vary widely in their approach to granting motions to 
dismiss given the differences in direction from the Supreme Court, the 
Federal Circuit, and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Currently, 
with the Federal Circuit holding that virtually any complaint will 
overcome a 12(b)(6) motion in a direct infringement suit, there is 
practical difficulty in terminating suits early, however frivolous they 
appear to be. However, as seen from the empirical study of sample cases 
in the previous section, district courts have not been applying Federal 
Circuit precedent predictably. It is true that some local patent rules tend 
to be good gatekeepers, but these local rules do not exist for every 
district, and are not uniform throughout the country. Besides, local patent 
rules typically apply after the pleading stage, and significant expenses 
have already been incurred by parties if frivolous suits are not stopped at 
the pleading stage. 
B. Effect on ‘Troll’ Lawsuits 
 The most efficient point at which weak lawsuits can be filtered is 
at pleading. Parties have not yet invested in significant attorney fees, the 
incentive to settle an extremely weak case is low, and the discovery costs 
are absent. Patent assertions based on hunches, where the plaintiff hopes 
to follow up with a “fishing expedition” would be discouraged early 
through heightened pleading requirements, and rightly so.85 Hence, it is 
easy to see that unmeritorious, ill-researched, and ill-motivated patent 
infringement lawsuits would be discouraged by heightening pleadings 
standards. Upon statutorily raising pleading standards, weak lawsuits 
would uniformly be handled by district courts in a manner similar to 
applying Twombly and Iqbal to direct patent infringement.  
 Of course, the benefit of filtering unmeritorious lawsuits has to 
be weighed against the cost of filtering out meritorious lawsuits from the 
court system. 
C. Adverse Effect on Legitimate Patent Litigation? 
 Although one can only speculate at this juncture, it seems 
unlikely that heightened pleading requirements will have a serious 
adverse impact on legitimate lawsuits. After all, several jurisdictions, 
such as the Eastern District of Texas as seen above, require detailed 
information regarding the infringement before discovery in any event. 
Requiring detailed information earlier in the pleading stage would not be 
a serious burden to the plaintiff in such jurisdictions. Indeed, it would 
                                                
85 See, e.g., DM Research, Inc. v. Coll. of Am. Pathologists, 170 F.3d 53, 55 (1st 
Cir.1999) (“Conclusory allegations in a complaint, if they stand alone, are a 
danger sign that the plaintiff is engaged in a fishing expedition.”). 




give plaintiffs one less reason to go forum shopping in an attempt to get 
to discovery more easily.86 
However, there would be some impact on legitimate suits where 
detailed pleading is simply not possible until later stages of litigation, 
and the actual impact on such suits remains to be seen. It is true that 
often times a plaintiff does not have access to detailed information 
regarding the functioning of an accused product to make detailed 
assertions before discovery.  The Innovation Act attempts to account for 
such a scenario by allowing a plaintiff to explain why detailed 
information was not available at pleading despite reasonable diligence.87  
This provision, while in theory allows a plaintiff to explain why a 
complaint was not well-pleaded, might turn out to be the exception that 
swallows the rule.  The exception might allow for excessive judicial 
discretion in allowing lawsuits through the door, thereby actually 
worsening uniformity at motions to dismiss.  
As long as the detrimental impact on frivolous suits and the 
advantage of uniformity vastly outweigh the impact on legitimate suits, 
the overall effect of heightened statutory pleading standards will be 
positive.88 
On a philosophical note, a plaintiff’s assertion that he or she does 
not have access to information that is required to plead a case of 
infringement begs the question why the plaintiff then believes there is 
ongoing patent infringement. At the very least, requiring more at 
pleading would force a plaintiff to perform more research at the 
complaint stage to ascertain the legitimacy of her suit. 89 This further 
effort might actually lead the plaintiff to conclude that there is no strong 
case for patent infringement after all, thereby acting as an efficient filter 
to frivolous lawsuits.  If the plaintiff spends considerable effort in 
                                                
86 Elizabeth P. Offen-Brown, Forum Shopping and Venue Transfer in Patent 
Cases: Marshall’s Response to TS Tech and Genetech, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 
61, 67 (2010). 
87 H.R. 9, 114th Cong. § 3(b) (2015) (“Information Not Readily Accessible.—If 
information required to be disclosed under subsection (a) is not readily 
accessible to a party, that information may instead be generally described, along 
with an explanation of why such undisclosed information was not readily 
accessible, and of any efforts made by such party to access such information.”) 
88 See Mark Andersen & Max Huffman, Iqbal, Twombly, and the Expected Cost 
of False Positive Error, 20 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 1, 20–-24 (2010). 
89 See Robert G. Bone, Twombly, Pleading Rules, and the Regulation of Court 
Access, 94 IOWA L. REV. 873, 909 (2009) (“[S]tricter pleading treats plaintiffs 
who do not have access to information less favorably than plaintiffs who do 
have access.”). 
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researching her case of infringement, and concludes that there is indeed 
ongoing infringement, requiring detail at the pleading stage will likely 
not discourage a suit that has a reasonable possibility of prevailing. 
It is worth noting that this apparent paradox is not specific to 
patent pleading, and was considered in some detail by academics, 
legislators, and judges following Twombly and Iqbal.90 While similar 
rationales hold in patent litigation as in any other lawsuits, the cost-
benefit analysis for patent litigation may differ in a few areas. 
D. Policy Considerations in Nuisance Patent Litigation 
 Arguably, civil rights under the Bill of Rights such as those 
litigated in Iqbal can be considered more fundamental than the right to 
assert a patent.91 Intellectual property right is after all a property right, so 
a colorable argument can be made that filtering out a few meritorious 
lawsuits might be a reasonable price to pay to avoid nuisance litigation, 
and more acceptable than errors in keeping away meritorious civil rights 
suits. Empirical studies analyzing the number of meritorious suits that 
are wrongly dismissed because of stringent pleading standards may 
throw more light on the exact value of the cost paid by the judicial 
system. However, such studies are hard to conduct because they often 
involve speculation regarding which of the dismissed suits would have 
ended up successful, based on very little or data. 
Apart from protection of individual property rights, patent 
infringement lawsuits have a significant impact on the economy. Strong 
intellectual property rights encourage companies to do business without 
fear of other companies replicating their technical innovations. Strong 
patent rights allow companies to spend significant resources on research 
and development.92 Discouraging patent litigation heavily much may 
have a negative impact on the economy, when companies feel that their 
patent rights would not be significantly protected. 
However, a significant increase in patent infringement filings, 
especially unmeritorious ones, has an adverse impact on judicial 
resources, budgets of companies, and the economy in general. Raising 
pleading standards to match other regular lawsuits may provide that 
                                                
90 See, e.g., Alexander A. Reinert, The Costs of Heightened Pleading, 86 IND. 
L.J. 119, 122 (2011). 
91 556 U.S. at 662 (The plaintiff alleged violations of his First and Fifth 
Amendment rights). 
92 See Kenneth L. Sokoloff , Intellectual Property Institutions in the United 
States: early development and comparative perspective, Journal of Economic 
Perspectives. 15(3): 233-246 (2001). 




balance, given that for most reasonable lawsuits, the information 
required in the complaint should be available to the plaintiff in any event. 
CONCLUSION 
Statutorily raising pleading standards will give district courts 
across the country much needed procedural uniformity with regards to 
patent pleading. The outcome of such a requirement can be predicted to a 
large extent from at least two sources: the treatment of indirect 
infringement pleading by the Federal Circuit and the district courts 
through the application of Twombly and Iqbal, and the impact of local 
rules. 
Overall, the outlook seems promising. Such a legislative change 
will keep out frivolous lawsuits and “fishing expeditions” very early in 
the progress of a lawsuit. This is critical, and the policy reasons behind 
the Supreme Court decisions in Twombly and Iqbal would unequivocally 
be implemented in patent infringement suits as well. 
